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Trusts and Estates 
by K. Bruce Friedman* 
In the field of trusts and estates, the year 1967 was fairly 
eventful. Examination of the court decisions reveals a con-
tinuing trend toward construing documents wherever possible 
to conform with the presumed intent of the testator or trustor, 
and toward liberal construction of statutory language. At 
the same time, several decisions hold in favor of creditors in 
their relationships with the decedent's estate or his survivors. 
From a legislative standpoint, there were several noteworthy 
revisions in the Probate and Civil Codes, most important of 
which was the adoption of a modified version of the Revised 
Uniform Principal and Income Act. 
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Case Law 
In the area of interpreting personal intent, Lawson v. 
Lowengad deals with the important question of the validity 
of an inter vivos trust. The court in construing the trustor's 
apparent intent, and thereby negating the trust, strongly re-
affirmed existing principles of law. The decedent in this case, 
shortly before suffering a heart attack that subsequently re-
sulted in her death, had, on two occasions, discussed with an 
attorney the preparation of an inter vivos trust that would 
include most of her property. The second discussion took 
place on the day preceding the heart attack. Several days 
later the attorney presented a trust instrument to the decedent, 
which the decedent signed without reading. The attorney 
thereupon left the hospital with the trust agreement and ob-
tained the signatures of the named trustees. The trust agree-
ment purported to transfer securities held in an agency ac-
count with a bank, and also authorized the trustees to receive 
other property. The trust was to be revocable by the decedent 
during her lifetime. As of the date of the decedent's death, a 
few days after she signed the trust agreement, the securities 
remained in the agency account in the bank's possession, not 
yet having been transferred to the trustees. The court of ap-
peal, in affirming the trial court's judgment in a quiet-title 
action brought by the executors of an earlier will, held that 
mere execution of the trust agreement is not sufficient to es-
tablish an inter vivos trust where there has been no actual or 
constructive delivery of corpus to the trustees. 
The court held, first, that, on the key point of intent, there 
was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding 
that the decedent signed the trust instrument under a mistake 
of fact since she had not read the document and did not under-
stand it, and because certain provisions of the trust were con-
trary to her repeatedly expressed wishes. Further, the court 
held that actual or symbolic delivery to the trustees of the trust 
corpus was essential to the validity of the trust, and was absent 
here. The agency account securities had not been indorsed 
1. 251 Cal. App.2d 98, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
186 (1967). 
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or physically delivered prior to the decedent's death; and in 
the absence of evidence of directions from the decedent for 
delivery of the trust instrument to the trustees, the fact that 
the decedent signed the instrument and handed it to her at-
torney did not itself constitute constructive delivery. 
In reaching its decision on these points, the court relied on 
numerous prior rulings indicating that mistake of fact,2 lack 
of intent to effect a delivery,3 and lack of effective delivery4 
were sufficient to negate the effect of signing the trust instru-
ment. 
In a second case, Estate of Taylor,5 the supreme court 
stretched the meaning of Probate Code section 142 in order to 
effectuate the desires of a testator. In this case, the decedent 
by her will left one-third of the residue of her estate to a friend, 
on the condition that the friend survive distribution of the 
estate. Otherwise, this third was to go to two alternate bene-
ficiaries, one of whom was also the executor of the decedent's 
will. The legatee died eighteen months after the decedent, 
but prior to distribution. The court held, on the basis of a 
reasonable timetable for administering this estate, that the 
executor had delayed unreasonably in making distribution, 
that the estate should have been distributed before the legatee 
died, and that the interest of the legatee consequently vested in 
her before her death. 
The probate court had found that the estate could have been 
distributed in September, 1964, and should have been dis-
tributed before the legatee's death in March, 1965. The 
executor instead decided, in the fall of 1964, to sell securities, 
many of which could have been distributed in kind without 
detriment to the cash needs of the estate. The supreme court 
held that the findings were supported by the evidence, and on 
these facts found that the legatee's contingent interest had 
2. Turino v. Capra, 237 Cal. App.2d 2d 456 (1939); Jeannerette v. Taylor, :: 
733, 47 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1965). Cal. App.2d 568, 38 P.2d 831 (1934). 
3. See Bank of America v. Frost, 205 4. Miller v. Jansen, 21 Cal.2d 473. 
Cal. App.2d 614, 23 Cal. Rptr. 441 132 P.2d 801 (1943). 
(1962); Kunde v. Kunde, 122 Cal App. 5. 66 Cal.2d 855, 59 Cal. Rptr. 437, 
2d 624, 266 P.2d 608 (1954); Estate of 428 P.2d 301 (1967). 
McConkey, 33 Cal. App.2d 554, 92 P. 
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vested at the time distribution should have been made. The 
legatee's estate was thus entitled to her interest in the dece-
dent's estate. 
In its decision, the court took note of Probate Code section 
142,6 but found no inconsistency between the statute and its 
own determination that the legatee's contingent interest had 
vested. The opinion of the court stressed that: 
The crucial issue under this section is whether a clause 
requiring survivorship should be interpreted to mean 
survivorship to distribution or survivorship to the time 
distribution should have occurred, or, as an alternative, 
whether survivorship to the earlier date constitutes sub-
stantial compliance with the condition. Under either 
interpretation we believe that unreasonable delay cannot 
defeat the beneficiary's interest. This conclusion pro-
motes the established policy favoring prompt distribution 
of estates . . . and carries out the presumed intent of 
the testatrix. 7 
Another issue worthy of comment resulted from the cross 
appeal of the personal representative of the primary benefici-
ary's estate, on the ground that the trial court had allowed 
the executor and his attorney extraordinary compensation. 
The court ruled that the allowance of the extra compensation 
was justified in spite of the delay in settling the estate because 
of otherwise justified services. It would seem more in keeping 
with the policy favoring the swift settlement of estates for a 
court first to consider and fix the extraordinary compensation 
and then to deduct a certain sum to compensate for unneces-
sary delay in distribution. 
In a federal estate tax case dealing with the important ques-
tion whether property held in a revocable trust can at the same 
time be community property, the United States Court of Ap-
6. "A condition precedent in a will is 
one which is required to be fulfilled be-
fore a particular disposition takes effect. 
It is to be deemed performed when the 
testator's intention has been substantial-
ly, though not literally, complied with. 
208 CAL LAW 1~67 
Nothing vests until such condition is ful-
filled, except where fulfillment is im-
possible . . . ." 
7. 66 Cal.2d at 858, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 
439 (1967). 
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peals for the Ninth Circuit, reversing the trial court, relied 
heavily on the intent of the trustors. In Katz v. United States,S 
property, which for purposes of the decision was assumed to 
be post-1927 California community property, was transferred 
to a revocable trust naming the husband as trustor. The pro-
visions of the trust instrument reserved to the husband-trustor, 
during his lifetime, full rights to the trust income and the right 
to amend or revoke the trust. After the husband's death, the 
trust was to continue for the benefit of the wife during her life-
time, and then for the benefit of the children. Both husband 
and wife had affixed written approval to the trust instrument. 
Later, the husband caused the trust to be amended twice, and 
in each instance the wife's written approval was obtained. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of California9 had held that by reason of the powers reserved 
to the husband, the execution of the trust transmuted com-
munity property into the husband's separate property. Since 
the provisions of the continuing trust did not meet the require-
ments of the federal estate tax marital deduction, the entire 
trust property was held includible in the husband's taxable 
estate. The Ninth Circuit reversed,lO holding that the statu-
tory presumption that property acquired by the spouses during 
marriage is community propertyll is particularly strong when 
the property was acquired with community property, and that 
this presumption extends to every type of property, including 
a retained equitable interest in a trust.12 
On the particular facts, the court found no language by 
which the wife had conveyed any property interest to the hus-
band. The wife's consent to each amendment of the trust (in 
the absence of which the wife, after the husband's death, could 
have set aside the trust as to her community property interest) 
was taken to be an indication of the parties' belief that she had 
8. 382 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. [1967]). 
9. 255 F. Supp. 642 (1966). 
10. In reversing, the court remanded 
for determination of the community 
character of the properties at the time 
of conveyance to the trust. 
11. Cal. Civ. Code § 164. 
14 
12. The court cited Hill v. Conover, 
191 Cal. App.2d 171, 12 Cal. Rptr. 522 
(1961); Henie v. Henie, 171 Cal. App. 
2d 572, 340 P.2d 1024 (1959); Givens 
v. Johnson, 73 Cal. App.2d 139, 166 P. 
2d 67 (1946). 
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a community property interest. The court thus concluded that 
there had been no intent by her to transmute community prop-
erty to separate property of the husband. It further held that 
the trust did not confer upon the husband a general power of 
appointment over the wife's interest in the community property 
held in the trust, but rather that whatever powers the husband 
had with respect to the trust property were held by him as 
manager of or agent for the community. 
The Ninth Circuit's decision would seem to be correct. The 
facts suggest no intent to transmute community into separate 
property, and the interposition of a trustee holding legal title 
should not change the result. The import of the decision, in 
addition to the estate tax result, must also be that no taxable 
gift from the wife to the husband had taken place. Finally, 
and very important, in holding that under California law, a 
retained equitable interest in a trust can be community prop-
erty, the court provides needed support for the position that 
appreciated community property placed in a revocable trust 
qualifies, on the death of the first of the spouses to die, for a 
full stepped-up basis for federal income tax purposes.13 
In keeping with the preceding cases, which evidence liberal-
ity in construing intent of testators or trustors, the courts in 
the cases noted below show liberality in statutory construction. 
Although it represents a somewhat special situation, an in-
dication of the courts' approach to statutory construction was 
evident in Estate of Chichernea. 14 This case held that Cali-
fornia residents can validly bequeath property to persons who 
are citizens and residents of Rumania. The issue arose be-
cause Probate Code section 259 makes the inheritance rights 
of aliens not residing in the United States dependent upon the 
existence of reciprocal, nondiscriminatory rights of inheritance 
on the part of United States citizens under the laws of the 
foreign beneficiary's country. The court determined that 
temporary restrictions imposed by Rumanian law upon the 
right of United States citizens to remove inheritance proceeds 
13. lnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b) 14. 66 Cal.2d 83, 57 Cal. Rptr. 135, 
(6). See also Rev. Rul. 66-283, 1966- 424 P.2d 687 (1967). 
2 Cum. Bull. 297. 
210 CAL LAW 1967 
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from Rumania were not fatal to the reciprocity required by 
Probate Code section 259, since a restriction upon removal is 
comparable to a currency restriction, and is not a limitation 
on the right to inherit. The court referred to its decision some 
months earlier, wherein it used similar reasoning to uphold 
the right of citizens and residents of the Soviet Union to in-
herit from California residents.15 It reaffirmed the principle 
that reciprocity does not turn on whether the political and 
socioeconomic institutions of the foreign nation are in accord 
with our own. Unless the ability of a United States resident 
to inherit under the law of the foreign country is "economically 
insignificant," all that section 259 requires is that the right of a 
United States citizen to inherit in the foreign country be on a 
parity with the right of one of that country's citizens to re-
ceive an inheritance in his own country. In applying this 
standard the court emphasized that not only the written law 
itself but also the manner in which it had been consistently 
applied should be considered. Answering the State of Cali-
fornia's argument that on the date of death, Rumanian law 
required alien beneficiaries to secure official approval to dis-
pose of the proceeds of a Rumanian estate and that there was 
consequently no reciprocity, the court further pointed out that 
the time of distribution would be the proper moment to deter-
mine the freedom of our citizens to remove inheritance pro-
ceeds. 
Of somewhat wider application in the matter of statutory in-
terpretation was the court's decision in Estate of Christian-
sen.16 This case holds that, in addition to distributions of sur-
plus income that are already specifically permitted by statute,17 
a probate court has the power to authorize the making of gifts 
of principal from an incompetent's estate for estate-planning 
purposes. The incompetent in this case was in her seventies, 
and there was virtually no possibility of her restoration to 
competency. The income of the incompetent's estate was 
more than sufficient to maintain her. On the basis of Probate 
Code section 1558/8 the probate court had authorized the 
15. Estate of Larkin, 65 Cal.2d 60, 16. 248 Cal. App.2d 398, 56 Cal. 
52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 416 P.2d 473 (1966). Rptr. 505 (1967). 
17. Cal. Prob. Code § 1558. 
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guardian to pay surplus income of the estate to each of the 
incompetent's adult children, but had ruled that it possessed 
no authority to permit the guardian to make gifts from prin-
cipal to the incompetent's children and grandchildren. The 
court of appeal, however, concluded that the probate court, 
in the exercise of its equitable powers, might substitute its 
judgment for that of the incompetent and authorize gifts of 
principal to the natural objects of the incompetent's bounty, 
in situations not covered by section 1558. The court also 
relied upon Probate Code section 1516, which provides that: 
[I]n all cases where no other or no different procedure 
is provided by statute, the court on petition of the 
guardian,' may from time to time instruct the 
guardian as to the administration of the ward's estate 
and the disposition, management, care, protection or 
preservation of the estate or any property thereof .... 
In establishing this new California rule, permitting gifts to 
be made from principal, the court, citing authority from other 
jurisdictions, held that "the guardian should be authorized 
to act as a reasonable and prudent man would act under 
the same circumstances, unless there is evidence of any set-
tled intention of the incompetent, formed while sane, to the 
contrary."19 The court reversed the order of the probate 
court and remanded the case for further proceedings, indicat-
ing that before authorizing gifts of the incompetent's prop-
erty, the probate court should consider the needs of the 
incompetent, the permanency of the disability, the devolution 
of the property upon the incompetent's death and the pre-
sumed donative intent. 
Thus the court, in expanding Probate Code section 1558 
by combining it with Probate Code section 1516, has now 
18. "On the application of the guard-
ian or next of kin of an insane or in-
competent person, the court may direct 
the guardian to pay and distribute sur-
plus income, not used for the support 
and maintenance of the ward, or any 
part of such surplus income, to the next 
of kin whom the ward would, in the 
212 CAL LAW 1967 
judgment of the court, have aided, if 
said ward had been of sound mind. 
The granting of such allowance and the 
amounts and proportions thereof shall 
be discretionary with the court .... " 
19. 248 Cal. App.2d at 422-423, 56 
Cal. Rptr. at 521 (1967). 
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authorized transfers of the incompetent's property for the 
purpose of avoiding unnecessary estate and inheritance taxes 
and expenses of administration. This decision is particularly 
important to estate planners, who may now obtain court 
sanction for gifts from guardianship estates. 
Although the preceding cases bend the statutory language, 
the court in Satterfield v. Garmire20 relied on equitable prin-
ciples to virtually nullify a statute. Contrary to the specific 
language of the statute, the court excused, under a special 
combination of circumstances, the failure to file or present 
a creditor's claim within the period prescribed by Probate 
Code sections 700 and 707. The case involved actions for 
personal injuries and wrongful death that were commenced 
against the decedent's estate some two months after the first 
publication of notice to creditors, at a time when negotia-
tions with the decedent's insurance carrier were already in 
progress. These negotiations commenced before, and con-
tinued until after, expiration of the six-month period pre-
scribed by statute for filing or presenting creditors' claims. 
In holding that the trial court had improperly sustained a 
general demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint with-
out leave to amend, the supreme court found that the purpose 
of Probate Code section 707 is twofold. First, it insures 
that the personal representative will be notified within a 
reasonable period of time of all claims so that the estate 
may be expeditiously settled. Second, it provides an oppor-
tunity for amicable disposition of a claim prior to the com-
mencement of any action and thus protects the estate from 
the expense of needless litigation. 
The court stated that since the defendant had already 
received all the benefits that section 707 was intended to 
confer, the plaintiff should not be denied the right to sue. 
In this connection the court noted that negotiations for settle-
ment were carried on for two months prior to the filing of 
the action and did not cease until after expiration of the 
six-month period, and that the action was filed by mutual 
20. 65 Cal.2d 638, 56 Cal. Rptr. 102, 
422 P.2d 990 (1967). 
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agreement. Thus the executor was not in breach of his 
fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries in impliedly waiving the 
code provision. The court emphasized the fact that gen-
erally it is not within the authority of an executor or admin-
istrator to waive formal presentation of a claim, but concluded 
that: 
[H]e may do so where this congeries of circumstances 
exists prior to the expiration of the period for filing 
a claim; he has knowledge of the claim and concedes 
its merit save only as to the specific sum; the estate is 
protected by insurance coverage exceeding the amount 
of the claim; and waiver results in relinquishment of 
no substantial benefit of or causes no detriment to the 
heirs or legatees.1 
This case is noteworthy, since most lawyers and commentators 
have assumed that the statute of limitations on filing creditors' 
claims was absolute and without exception. 
In the area of protecting creditors' rights, an important 
decision is Estate of Silverman. 2 This case of first impression 
holds that a widow's family allowance, in the hands of the 
executor of her husband's estate, is not exempt from attach-
ment and execution. 
The case involved separate attachments, ancillary to a 
municipal court action against the widow, levied upon the 
executor, who consequently withheld payment of family 
allowance that had been ordered paid to the widow. Af-
firming the trial court's ruling, the court held that a family 
allowance is not property specifically exempted from execu-
tion under section 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 
the sections enumerated therein. Therefore, since there is 
no specific statutory exemption, a family allowance is subject 
to attachment under section 541 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure,3 as a debt due the defendant and as property of the 
1. 65 Cal.2d at 645, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 3. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 541. 
107, 422 P.2d at 995. "Shares of Stock and Debts Due De-
2. 249 Cal. App.2d 180, 57 Cal. Rptr. fendant, How Attached and Disposed 
379 (1967). of. The rights or shares which the de-
214 CAL LAW 1967 
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defendant. In dismissing the argument that such funds are 
in custodia legis, subject to attachment only with permission 
of the court exercising custody, the court held that the funds 
are actually in the hands of the executor, who is under a court 
order to distribute them. 
The important question suggested by this case is whether 
a widow's family allowance should in fact be subject to 
attachment. Perhaps statutory exemption should be con-
ferred on this type of fund, on a basis comparable to a judg-
ment debtor's exemption under section 690.11 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure.4 An alternative solution would be to 
grant an exemption for the family allowance on a basis anal-
ogous to the spendthrift trust, where only excess income 
can be reached by creditors. 5 In other words, statutory 
exemption would be provided for that part of the family 
allowance award that is necessary for basic support. 6 
In another case, Rupp v. Kahn,7 the court decided an issue 
of significance with respect to transfers made for the purpose 
of avoiding obligations to creditors. The decision passed on 
a question apparently never decided in California in the 
context of the rights of a surviving joint tenant. The court 
fendant may have in the stock of any 
corporation or company, together with 
the interest and profit thereon, and all 
debts due such defendant, and all other 
property in this State of such defendant 
not exempt from execution, may be at-
tached, and if judgment be recovered, 
be sold to satisfy the judgment and exe-
cution." 
4. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 690.1l. 
"Property exempt from execution or at-
tachment: Earnings: Filing with levy-
ing officer affidavit of service of sum· 
mons and complaint or of notice that 
attachment on earnings to issue. One-
half of the earnings of the defendant or 
judgment debtor received for his per-
sonal services rendered at any time with-
in 30 days next preceding the levy of 
attachment or execution shall be exempt 
from execution or attachment without 
filing a claim for exemption as provided 
in Section 690.26. 
"All of such earnings, if necessary for 
the use of the debtor's family, residing 
in this State, and supported in whole 
or in part by such debtor unless the 
debts are: (a) incurred by such debtor, 
his wife or family, for the common nec-
essaries of life; or, (b) incurred for per-
sonal services rendered by any em-
ployee, or former employee, of such 
debtor. . . ." 
5. Cal. Civ. Code § 859. 
6. See Cal. Prob. Code § 680, which 
states in part that the family allowance 
shall provide what is "necessary for 
their maintenance according to their 
circumstances." This has been con-
strned to mean the standard of living 
as it existed during the lifetime of the 
deceased. In re Lux Estate, 114 Cal. 
73, 45 P. 1023 (1896). 
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held that where an insolvent, without consideration, places 
property in joint tenancy, the entire title held by the surviving 
joint tenant is subject to the debts of the deceased joint tenant. 
In his complaint, the creditor alleged that the decedent, while 
insolvent, had acquired various properties, taking title in 
the names of his wife and himself as joint tenants. The 
creditor sought a declaration that the wife as surviving joint 
tenant held the property as trustee for the benefit of plaintiff 
as a creditor. Reversing the trial court's holding, which had 
sustained a demurrer to this cause of action without leave 
to amend, the court of appeal held that an insolvent's crea-
tion of a joint tenancy, without consideration, is a transfer 
in fraud of creditors.8 The decision stated that after the 
insolvent's death, as well as during his lifetime, his creditors 
can reach the entire joint tenancy property.9 In the usual 
case, by comparison, a joint tenant's undivided interest is 
reachable by his creditors only during his lifetime, and, at his 
death, complete title vests in the surviving joint tenant and the 
entire property is placed beyond the reach of the decedent's 
creditors.1o 
Finally, a decision that construes statutory language strictly 
is Estate of Johnston. ll In this case, the court held that a 
minor child, who attempts to reach his father's income in-
terest in a spendthrift trust in enforcement of support claims, 
like any other creditor, can reach only income in excess of 
the amount necessary for the beneficiary's support. 12 The 
appellant, the children's guardian, had contended that her 
children were in a special preferred category, despite Civil 
Code section 859/3 regardless of whether there was excess 
7. 246 Cal. App.2d 188, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
108 (1966). 
8. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04. 
9. With respect to creditors' rights 
against the property during the insol-
vent's lifetime, see Carter v. Carter, 55 
Cal. App.2d 13, 130 P.2d 186 (1942). 
10. It would seem that the opinion 
in this case should be the same, regard-
less of whether the property conveyed 
into joint tenancy would be community 
216 CAL LAW 1967 
or separate, since both would be sub-
ject to the debts of the husband. 
11. 252 Cal. App.2d 988, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 852 (1967). 
12. Cal. Civ. Code § 859. 
13. Cal. Civ. Code § 859. "Rents 
and profits liable to creditors in certain 
cases. Where a trust is created to re-
ceive the rents and profits of real or 
personal property, and no valid direc-
tion for accumulation is given, the sur-
12
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income and regardless of the spendthrift provisions. Reject-
ing this argument, the court determined that the statute makes 
no special exception that would permit the child to reach 
the beneficiary's interest in the trust without a finding as to 
excess income. 
The court pointed out that although this was a case of 
first impression, San Diego Trust and Savings Bank v. Heustis14 
had involved a similar problem; a divorced wife was attempt-
ing to reach income from a spendthrift trust, advancing the 
same proposition but seeking alimony rather than child-
support payments. The court in that case had refused to 
treat the woman as a special or preferred creditor. 
Legislative Developments 
The most signicant legislative development in the field of 
trusts was the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act,15 
which is operative July 1, 1968.16 Significant provisions of 
the Act deal with the establishment of reserves for deprecia-
tion; the depletion of natural resources; the treatment of 
extraordinary corporate distributions; and the right to income 
earned during probate administration. The new Act is ap-
plicable to any receipt or expense received or incurred after 
its operative date, regardless of when the trust was estab-
lished.17 
Prior to the 1967 legislation, the California Principal and 
Income Law was silent on the question of establishing reserves 
for depreciation. IS A recent decision on the point had been 
Estate of Kelley.I9 In the Kelley case, the trustees of a testa-
plus of such rents and profits, beyond 
the sum that may be necessary for the 
education and support of the person for 
whose benefit the trust is created, is lia-
ble to the claims of the creditors of such 
persons, in the same manner as personal 
property which cannot be reached by ex-
ecution." 
14. 121 Cal. App. 675, 10 P.2d 158 
(1932). 
15. Cal. Stats, 1967, chap. 1508, §§ 1, 
2,p.-. 
16. New Cal. Civ. Code § 730.16. 
Note that the new act applies to trusts 
only and does not include the legal life 
estate. Compare old § 730.04 (Cal. 
Stats. 1953, ch. 37, § 1, p. 667) with 
new § 730.03(b). 
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 730.15. 
18. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 730-730.15. 
(Added Cal. Stats. 1967 ch. 1508, § 2.) 
19. 63 Cal.2d 679, 47 Cal. Rptr. 897, 
408 P.2d 353 (1965). 
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mentary trust had borrowed $200,000 in order to remodel 
and structurally improve a building containing a store. These 
improvements were made in order to obtain renewal of a 
favorable lease of the store premises held in the trust. The 
court determined that depreciation should be charged against 
income, on the basis of the value of the extraordinary capital 
improvements over their anticipated useful life, and that this 
treatment produced an equitable result as between the life 
tenant and the remainderman. The court further stated that 
depreciation of income-producing real property that was part 
of the original corpus received by the trustee is also a proper 
charge against income, unless the trust instrument expresses 
a contrary intent. 
The 1967 California legislation departs from the rule 
stated in the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 
which adopted the same rule as that in the Kelley case. The 
California version of the Act leaves the establishment of re-
serves for depreciation to the "absolute discretion" of the 
trustee, unless the governing instrument provides otherwise.20 
It further provides that whatever allowance for depreciation 
the trustee may make shall be made "under generally accepted 
accounting principles,"l but that no allowance shall be made 
for depreciation of that portion of real property used by a 
beneficiary as a residence. The meaning of "generally ac-
cepted accounting principles," a phrase that also appears in 
the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, may be 
questioned. For example, in Estate of Kellei the court 
indicated that depreciation should be taken on a straight-line 
basis over the anticipated useful life of the improvements. 
However, there are various acceptable methods of calculat-
ing depreciation, and the revised rule may well be interpreted 
to permit these variations. 
Another potential difficulty could arise from the provision 
of the new law that when an unincorporated business is held 
20. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 730.13(a)(2), 
730.14. The legislative negation of the 
requirement of Kelley, that depreciation 
be taken, is immediate. This result is 
achieved by newly-enacted § 730.16 of 
the present Principal and Income law, 
218 CAL LAW 1967 
which will apply until the new act be-
comes effective on July 1, 1968. 
1. Cal. Civ. Code § 730.13(a)(2). 
2. 63 Cal.2d at 689, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 
903, 408 P.2d at 359 (1965). 
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in trust, the net profits, "computed in accordance with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles for a comparable busi-
ness," are income.3 To the extent that such accounting prin-
ciples may require that reserves for depreciation be established 
for business properties, this section is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Act that give the trustee absolute discretion 
over whether to establish depreciation reserves. 
The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act also deals 
with depletion of natural resources. Under old Civil Code 
section 730.11, proceeds received from depletion of natural 
resources were to be wholly allocated to income unless the 
trustee was under a duty to reinvest the property from which 
the proceeds were derived. New Civil Code sections 730.09-
730.11 change the rule to provide that, with certain excep-
tions,4 and with the limitation that any allowance for deple-
tion be reasonable, the trustee is to have absolute discretion 
in allocating receipts from natural resources to principal or 
income. 
Turning to other provisions of the 1967 principal and in-
come legislation, new Civil Code section 730.06, dealing 
with extraordinary corporate distributions, is a departure from 
old section 730.07, which provided that distributions of cor-
porate shares that were not of the same kind or rank, or were 
not derived from a capitalization of surplus, were income. 
The new section adopts the so-called "Massachusetts rule," 
which provides that all corporate distributions of shares and 
subscription rights of the distributing corporation be treated 
as principal. It also provides that capital gains distributions 
of a regulated investment company are principa1.6 This pro-
vision is of special importance in protecting the federal estate 
tax deduction for a charitable remainder interest under a 
trust, from the standpoint of preserving the ascertainable value 
of the remainder interest.6 
The new Principal and Income Act changes the law as 
to the right to income earned during probate adminstration, 
3. New Cal. Civ. Code § 730.08. 
4. See Cal. Civ. Code § 730.09 for 
exceptions on royalties. 
5. Cal. Civ. Code § 730.06(c). 
6. See Int. Rev. Code 2055. See also 
Rev. Rul. 60-385, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 
77; Rev. Rul. 67-33, 1967-5 Int. Rev 
Bull. 9. 
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as between beneficiaries of a testamentary trust. New Civil 
Code section 730.05 refers to the applicable provisions of 
the Probate Code, which establish the rule that unless the 
will provides otherwise, income from trust assets accrues 
from the date of death.7 New section 730.04(a) clarifies 
the application of this rule in the situation where the income 
beneficiary of a testamentary trust dies during the period of 
probate administration. New section 730.04( a) provides 
that the right to income, absent other directions in the gov-
erning instrument, accrues from the date an asset becomes 
subject to the trust, and that an asset becomes subject to a 
testamentary trust as of the date of the testator's death. This 
section overcomes existing case law to the effect that the 
death of an income beneficiary of a testamentary trust, occur-
ring during the probate period, terminates his right to income 
that has been accumulating in the probate estate for distribu-
tion to the trustee.8 
Turning to other 1967 legislation, new Probate Code sec-
tion 1122 and Civil Code section 2274 depart from old 
Civil Code section 2274, which had limited trustee fees to 
the amount specified in the trust instrument.9 The sections 
now provide that when the trustee's compensation is fixed by 
the provisions of the will or of the declaration of trust, the 
court may nevertheless, on proper showing, allow the trustee 
greater compensation, where the duties of the trustee are 
substantially greater than were contemplated, where the com-
pensation fixed by the instrument would be so unreasonably 
low that a competent trustee would not undertake to admin-
ister the trust, or in other extraordinary circumstances. Since 
inter vivos trusts, as opposed to testamentary trusts, are not 
subject to court supervision in a continuing probate proceed-
7. See Cal. Prob. Code §§ 160, 162 
and 162.5. 
8. Estate of Feldman, 145 Cal. App. 
2d 19, 301 P.2d 627 (1956). 
9. The case law strictly construed the 
statute. See In re Barton's Estate, 96 
Cal. App.2d 234, 214 P.2d 857 (1950); 
In re Whitney's Estate, 78 Cal. App. 
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638, 248 P. 754 (1926). See also In re 
Bodger's Estate, 130 Cal. App.2d 416, 
279 P.2d 61 (1955), which holds that 
Cal. Civ. Code § 2274 and Cal. Prob. 
Code § 1122 are complementary and 
therefore where trustee fees are fixed in 
trust instrument, Cal. Prob. Code § 1122 
does not apply. 
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ing, Civil Code section 2274 provides that the superior court 
shall have jurisdiction to determine the trustee's compensation 
in an action brought by the trustee of an inter vivos trust, 
to which all interested persons are made parties. 
Two other significant Probate Code changes are the 1967 
amendment of section 423 and the addition of section 1120.2. 
The amendment of Probate Code section 423 extends the 
right of nomination of administrators to residents of the United 
States of designated relationship to the decedent,lO who, but 
for nonresidence in California, would themselves be entitled 
to administration. New Probate Code section 1120.2 permits 
the court to confer upon a testamentary trustee any or all of 
a set of listed administrative powers not inconsistent with 
the provisions or purposes of the trust. This last statute will 
prove useful in cases where the trustee's administrative powers, 
set forth in the will, are incomplete. 
Smaller estates are affected by the amendment of Probate 
Code section 630, which increases from $2,000 to $3,000 the 
amount of an estate, consisting of personal property only, 
that may be turned over to the decedent's next of kin, without 
probate. Small estates are also affected by amendment of 
Probate Code sections 645 and 646, which provide for sum-
mary distribution to the surviving spouse or minor children 
of estates not exceeding $5,000, and measure the "other 
estate" limitation applicable to the distributees by the amount 
of the homestead exemption allowed the head of a family 
(presently $15,000). Formerly this limitation was in the 
fixed amount of $12,500. 
With respect to distributions to nonresident beneficiaries, 
section 19262 of the Revenue and Taxation Code was 
amended in 1967 to require a certificate from the Franchise 
Tax Board showing that all taxes due it have been paid, in 
cases where assets having a total value of $5,000 are distribut-
able from an estate on one or more nonresidents. The section 
10. Those now included under the 
1967 amendment are child, grandchild, 
parent, brother and sister. Under for-
mer law, the only nonresident who was 
eligible to nominate an administrator 
was a nonresident spouse. Cal. Prob. 
Code § 422. 
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formerly required such a certificate if the value of the estate 
exceeded $50,000 and any beneficiary was a nonresident. 
Other miscellaneous changes include the amendment of 
Probate Code section 1233, to codify California case lawll 
to the effect that the Civil Discovery Ace2 is applicable to 
probate proceedings. An amendment to Probate Code sec-
tion 1852 adds to the powers of conservators those powers 
granted to guardians by Probate Code sections 1550 through 
1560.13 
11. See, e.g., In re Neilson's Estate, 
57 Cal.2d 733, 22 Cal. Rptr. I, 371 P. 
2d 745 (1962); Coberly v. Superior 
Court, 231 Cal. App.2d 685, 42 Cal. 
Rptr. 64 (1965). 
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12. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 307 and 
2016. 
13. Corresponding technical amend-
ments were therefore made to Cal. Prob. 
Code §§ 426, 630, 1060, 1062, 1121, 
1208 and 1233. 
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